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RESPONSE 
 
CATCH-ALL DOCTRINALISM  
AND JUDICIAL DESIRE 
ANYA BERNSTEIN† 
 In response to Carlos M. Vázquez & Stephen I. Vladeck, State Law, 
the Westfall Act, and the Nature of the Bivens Question, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 
509 (2013). 
INTRODUCTION 
Courts confronting Bivens1 claims—damages suits for constitutional 
violations committed by federal employees—like to note that the remedy 
is hanging on for dear life. Supreme Court Justices have stated that Bivens 
should be a thing of the past.2 Appeals courts, in dicta, have described the 
threshold for dismissing a Bivens claim as “remarkably low.”3 One court 
has even suggested that Bivens remedies, which vindicate constitutional 
rights when a statutory cause of action is not available, should be allowed 
 
† Bigelow Fellow and Lecturer in Law, University of Chicago Law School. Thanks to 
Alexander Boni-Saenz, Aziz Huq, and Laura Weinrib for helpful comments. 
1 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).  
2 See, e.g., Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 568 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Bivens is a 
relic of the heady days in which this Court assumed common-law powers to create causes of action.” 
(quoting Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring))). Of course, 
Bivens itself was a reaction to the Court’s earlier assumption of common law powers to expand official 
immunity. See Anya Bernstein, Congressional Will and the Role of the Executive in Bivens Actions: What 
Is Special About Special Factors?, 45 IND. L. REV. 719, 727 (2012) (“As people’s practical ability to sue 
errant federal actors diminished, the Bivens Court reintroduced a remedy that had been universally 
available when the Constitution was written.”). The Justices who object to Bivens have never 
explained how they distinguish it from other exertions of common law power.  
3 E.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 574 (2d Cir. 2009).  
14 Bernstein Final.docx (DO NOT DELETE)4/3/2013 9:51 AM 
222 University of Pennsylvania Law Review Online [Vol. 161: 221 
only when a statutory cause of action is available.4 Bivens is not dead yet: 
Fourth Amendment violations that reprise Bivens itself, 5  and Eighth 
Amendment violations by federally employed officials, 6  remain solid 
candidates for relief.7 But when cases depart from these prototypical 
scenarios—and especially when they arise out of national security pro-
jects—courts are reluctant to hear them.  
In a provocative new article, Professors Carlos Vázquez and Stephen 
Vladeck suggest that courts dismiss these cases because judges believe 
that “extending” Bivens into any “new context” instantiates disfavored 
judicial lawmaking.8 But, they argue, these judges have it backwards: 
most often, it is refusing to recognize a Bivens claim that constitutes 
judicial lawmaking. 9  Recognizing one, in contrast, furthers the law 
Congress has made.10 Focusing on Bivens’s peculiar place in federalism 
and federal law, Vázquez and Vladeck demonstrate that the logic of 
 
4 See id. at 581 (stating that once Congress has “enact[ed] legislation that includes enumerated 
eligibility parameters, delineated safe harbors, defined review processes, and specific relief to be 
afforded[,] . . . then the courts . . . will be able to . . . provide judicial oversight”). 
5 Bivens involved a warrantless search of a home and an arrest that did not lead to prosecution, 
403 U.S. at 389, rendering the exclusionary rule inapplicable. 
6 Carlson v. Green held that constitutional damages suits could be brought directly against 
federal prison guards. 446 U.S. 14, 23 (1980). In 2012, the Supreme Court declined to recognize a 
constitutional damage remedy against privately employed prison guards working at a federal 
prison because, as private employees, the guards were subject to common law liability under 
California tort law. Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 626 (2012).  
7 See Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and Its Consequences for 
the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809, 842 (2010) (“[I]f Bivens claims survive [sua 
sponte judicial] screening, their rate of success is somewhere in between the . . . success rates for 
prisoner civil rights litigation and nonprisoner civil rights litigation.”). 
8 Carlos M. Vázquez & Stephen I. Vladeck, State Law, the Westfall Act, and the Nature of the 
Bivens Question, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 518 n.34, 524-26 (2013). What constitutes an “extension” 
into a “new context” therefore becomes a central debate. Compare, e.g., Arar, 585 F.3d at 572 
(concluding that the “context” of the lawsuit was “extraordinary rendition,” which was a “new 
context” for a Bivens action), with id. at 583, 597 (Sack, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(arguing that “Arar’s allegations do not present a ‘new context’ for a Bivens action,” insofar as they 
are premised on procedural and substantive due process violations by federal agents). For an 
argument that courts should explicitly decide whether a suit requires an extension of Bivens before 
deciding whether one is warranted, see Alexander A. Reinert & Lumen N. Mulligan, Asking the 
First Question: Reframing Bivens After Minneci, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) 
(manuscript at 22-25), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2042175.  
9 See Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 8, at 527 (asserting that “the displacement of common 
law remedies against federal officials would be just as much a legislative function as the creation of 
new federal rights of action,” and noting that “the status quo at the time of Bivens recognized the 
availability of common law remedies against federal officials”). 
10 See id. at 530 (“[R]ecognition of a new federal right of action would merely supple-
ment[—rather than displace—]state law.”). 
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courts’ own legal interpretations suggests expanding Bivens remedies, yet 
courts paradoxically choose to narrow them instead.11  
Why, and how, does that happen? Courts claim to reject Bivens ac-
tions out of passive virtue and institutional competence concerns. 
Vázquez and Vladeck focus on the former. But neither justification fully 
explains the situation. Examining how courts justify their Bivens dismis-
sals—through a results-oriented conflation of doctrines—reveals that the 
outcome drives the reasoning. That outcome is to insulate the Executive 
from those individuals it harms.  
I. JUDICIAL ACTIVISM:  
CLOSING A DOOR IS ALSO AN ACT 
Vázquez and Vladeck’s main thrust is that courts misunderstand what 
constitutes judge-made law in the Bivens context. Because there is no 
statutory right to damages for constitutional violations by federal employees, 
courts must decide whether to recognize each particular Bivens claim.12 
Recent appeals court cases assume that a plaintiff seeking Bivens relief has 
no other avenue of redress, and ask whether the plaintiff is entitled to any 
remedy at all.13 In contrast, the Supreme Court has generally asked whether 
a constitutional remedy should be available in addition to those remedies 
provided under state law.14 The question a Bivens claim raises is thus not 
whether there ought to be a remedy, but whether a federal remedy is prefer-
able to existing state remedies.15  
The state law path was complicated in 1988 by the Westfall Act, which 
made the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) the “exclusive” remedy for torts 
committed by federal actors, unless the suit was “brought for a violation of 
the Constitution of the United States.” 16  Courts usually interpret the 
Westfall Act as foreclosing state lawsuits for constitutional harms by federal 
 
11 Id. at 516. 
12 Bernstein, supra note 2, at 719; see also James E. Pfander & David Baltmanis, Rethinking 
Bivens: Legitimacy and Constitutional Adjudication, 98 GEO. L.J. 117, 121 (2009) (arguing that courts 
should presume a Bivens action is available, which would constitute a “fundamental change in the 
way courts evaluate the viability of a Bivens claim”). 
13 Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 8, at 519-23.  
14 See id. at 542-48 (noting that in Bivens, although the majority and dissent disagreed as 
to whether common law damage remedies were adequate, all nine Justices assumed they were 
available); see also id. at 513 n.16 (citing Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 620 (2012), as the 
latest iteration of this approach).  
15 See id. at 512 (noting that, in evaluating a Bivens claim, the appropriate inquiry is “Bivens 
or (only) state law,” rather than “Bivens or nothing”). 
16 Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (Westfall Act), 
Pub. L. No. 100-694, § 5, 102 Stat. 4563, 4564 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b) (2006)). 
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actors.17 They view the Westfall Act as preserving Bivens, but also making it 
the sole means of redress for these constitutional violations. This interpreta-
tion, Vázquez and Vladeck contend, justifies expanding Bivens, not con-
straining it.18 Because the Westfall Act clearly preserved plaintiffs’ ability to 
sue for constitutional violations, an exclusively federal regime must be 
capacious enough to encompass previously available state law remedies.19 
Confining Bivens to a narrower scope supplants Congress’s decision to 
preserve federal employee liability with a court’s decision to limit it. 
Moreover, the primary counterweights to Bivens claims—official immunity, 
the state secrets privilege, political question doctrine, and the like—are 
themselves judge-made law. Courts that constrain Bivens must explain why 
they choose to expand those other judge-made doctrines instead.20 
Vázquez and Vladeck accept courts’ assertions that the desire to avoid 
judicial activism leads them to decline Bivens claims, but they also ask courts 
to take their own legal interpretations seriously. The assumption that foreclos-
ing a lawsuit against federal employees is the least dangerous path relies on a 
very thin notion of judicial activism21—one that views opening the courthouse 
 
17 Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 8, at 566. 
18 Id. 
19 The House Report accompanying the Act explained that the Act “would not affect the 
ability of victims of constitutional torts to seek personal redress from Federal employees.” H.R. 
REP. NO. 100-700, at 6 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5945, 5949-50, cited in Vázquez & 
Vladeck, supra note 8, at 514. To “not affect” plaintiffs’ ability to sue, the scope of Bivens must be at 
least as broad as the scope of the relief available under any law—including state tort law—in effect 
at the time of the Act’s passage in 1988. Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 8, at 578. Vázquez and 
Vladeck also argue that the usual interpretation of the Westfall Act is wrong. In 1988, plaintiffs 
could sue federal employees both under Bivens and at common law. Thus, Vázquez and Vladeck 
contend, the Westfall Act preserves not only Bivens remedies, but also state common law remedies 
for constitutional violations. Id. at 577-79. The Act preserves individual liability in “a civil action 
against an employee of the Government[,] . . . which is brought for a violation of the Constitu-
tion of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2). Whether this language preserves actions at 
common law depends on whether one construes a common law action as an action “for” a violation of 
the federal Constitution, as opposed to “for” a common law tort. Although the House Report 
supports Vázquez and Vladeck, their interpretation would be easier to accept had Congress phrased 
the provision to exempt not just suits “for” constitutional violations but also suits arising from acts 
that violate the Constitution. Their more expansive reading would then better reflect the plain 
language of the statute. The standard, narrower reading, however, is also reasonable. It is at least open 
to question whether a state law suit would be “for” a constitutional violation absent a state statutory 
cause of action available to “persons injured by action under color of federal law that violates the 
Constitution”—a so-called “converse-1983” provision. Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 8, at 537 n.130 
(citing Akhil Reed Amar, Using State Law to Protect Federal Constitutional Rights: Some Questions and 
Answers About Converse-1983, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 159, 160 (1993)). 
20 Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 8, at 530.  
21 The concept of judicial activism is famously broad and malleable. See, e.g., Corey Ray-
burn Yung, Flexing Judicial Muscle: An Empirical Study of Judicial Activism in the Federal Courts, 
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door as an action, but closing it as a form of “not-doing.”22 The Supreme 
Court has warned against expanding Bivens liability without congressional 
support, but Congress has left the door for expansion open. Closing that 
door, Vázquez and Vladeck point out, is also an act. 
I agree that avoiding judge-made law is the primary reason courts give 
for dismissing Bivens cases. And I agree that it makes little sense. But, 
precisely because it makes so little sense, it can provide only a limited 
explanation of the courts’ hostility to Bivens.  
II.  INSTITUTIONAL INCOMPETENCE:  
A FRAMING CHOICE 
In addition to citing judicial modesty, courts often point to relative 
institutional competence to justify rejecting Bivens claims. Because the 
Executive knows more about foreign affairs, military order, and national 
security than courts do, the judiciary should yield in these arenas.23 Yet, 
the relative competence of an institution depends largely on what we need 
that institution to be competent at. Courts may be less competent than 
the Executive at determining the national security implications of a 
particular policy. But the question underlying Bivens claims is whether 
someone has violated another’s constitutional rights. Nobody beats the 
courts at answering that question.24 
 
105 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 10 (2011) (listing thirteen distinct aspects of judicial activism, which have 
been noted by various scholars). 
22 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 125 (2d ed. 1986) 
(discussing the “device[] of ‘not-doing,’” which is among the judiciary’s “passive virtues”).  
23 See, e.g., Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193, 200 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (“Judges lack 
information that executive officials possess . . . Congress and the Commander-in-Chief . . . , 
rather than civilian judges, ought to make the essential tradeoffs, not only because the 
constitutional authority to do so rests with the political branches of government but also 
because that’s where the expertise lies.”).  
24 Of course, it is an overstatement to say that courts are the only, or even the best, 
arbiters of legality. Popular constitutionalism holds that more decentralized views should, 
and in practice do, have comparable effects. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEM-
SELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 227 (2004) (“Americans in 
the past always came to the same conclusion: that it was their right, and their responsibility, 
as republican citizens to say finally what the Constitution means.”); Robert Post & Reva 
Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and Judicial Supremacy, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 
1027, 1030 (2004) (“[N]o one would accept any version of judicial supremacy that would 
prevent citizens from acting to alter the meaning of the Constitution . . . .”). Scholars have 
also noted that administrative agencies now interpret law as much as, if not more than, 
courts do. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Between Facts and Norms: Agency Statutory Interpretation 
as an Autonomous Enterprise, 55 U. TORONTO L.J. 497, 499 (2005) (“[I]n [our] legal world[,] 
agencies are of necessity the primary official interpreters of federal statutes and . . . that 
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Nevertheless, when asked to determine constitutionality, courts often 
rephrase the question as one of competence in some other domain, such as 
national security or foreign affairs. 25  Courts’ reluctance to justify this 
reframing—or even to acknowledge that it occurs—suggests that they use 
the language of competence—and of incompetence—toward a particular 
end.26 After all, competence is not inherent to either a person or an 
institution. It emerges, or atrophies, through practices over time. The 
Westfall Act’s preservation of constitutional damages actions against 
federal employees attributes to courts the institutional competence to hear 
such claims. If courts disagree with that assessment, it might have less to 
do with incompetence than with their unwillingness to bear the responsi-
bility that the Act, and the Constitution, implies.  
Circuit courts also appeal to another theory of institutional competence 
when rejecting Bivens claims. They note that the Supreme Court has not 
expanded Bivens liability in decades, and that individual Justices have 
expressed hostility toward Bivens claims.27 However, the Supreme Court has 
also declined many opportunities to eliminate Bivens liability. Perhaps some 
Justices are wary of creating a constitutional regime that lacks any way to 
effectuate its ostensible guarantee of individual rights.28 In any event, the 
American case law system depends on the articulation of legal reasoning in 
judicial opinions, not on winks and nods. For all the Supreme Court’s institu-
tional superiority, its reticence hardly presents a convincing legal reason. 
Institutional incompetence, though often cited by the courts, pro-
vides an unsatisfying explanation of courts’ propensity to dismiss Bivens 
 
role has been judicially legitimated as presumptively controlling . . . .”). Even so, it is at 
least roughly accurate to say that courts have competence to determine constitutionality.  
25 For example, in Arar v. Ashcroft, the plaintiff alleged that United States employees had con-
spired to effectuate his torture by the Syrian government. 585 F.3d 559, 566 (2d Cir. 2009). The 
Second Circuit refused to recognize a Bivens claim, in part because it would interfere with the 
executive policy of extraordinary rendition, which implicates national security and foreign policy 
concerns. Id. at 574-75. But the fact that certain acts were taken in the context of a particular policy 
cannot determine, legally speaking, whether those acts violated the Constitution. The Arar court thus 
reframed a question of constitutionality as a question of national security and foreign policy.  
26 Of course, there are doctrines that specifically allow for balancing relative institutional 
competence; I address these in the following section.  
27 See, e.g., Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540, 548 (4th Cir. 2012) (explaining that “the 
Supreme Court has monitored the limits of judicial competence to design implied remedies” and 
has “itself consistently refused to extend Bivens liability to any new context or new category of 
defendants” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Vance, 701 F.3d at 198 (noting that, after 
recognizing Bivens remedies in three specific contexts, the Supreme Court “has not created 
another during the last 32 years”). 
28 They may be right to be wary. Limited government and the vigorous protection of individual 
rights are central pillars of the United States’ self-presentation, both domestically and internationally.  
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claims. Perhaps focusing instead on how courts avoid Bivens claims will 
help get at why they do so.  
III.  CATCH-ALL DOCTRINALISM:  
ANALOGICAL REASONING FROM RESULTS 
As Vázquez and Vladeck point out, some recent opinions that purport 
to dismiss Bivens claims on the ground that a cause of action ought not be 
available in fact hang their analysis on other doctrines: immunity, privi-
lege, preemption,29 state secrets, and political question, among others. I 
will refer to this as catch-all doctrinalism.  
Here is how catch-all doctrinalism works: Courts determine whether a 
constitutional damages claim may be adjudicated on the merits by asking 
whether Congress wished to preclude it and whether the plaintiff has 
recourse elsewhere. If the claim is precluded or the remedy is redundant, 
the case cannot go forward. There are also other situations in which a case 
cannot go forward: defendants who have immunity cannot be sued; the 
state secrets privilege may bar lawsuits whose revelations would adversely 
affect national security; courts may refuse to review certain acts under the 
political question doctrine. Catch-all doctrinalism employs concepts such 
as immunity, state secrets, and the political question doctrine to answer 
unrelated questions about concepts such as causes of action.30 The doc-
trines appear connected because they may all lead to the same result: 
precluding the lawsuit. But they are not connected in the way catch-all 
doctrinalism suggests, because law’s analogical reasoning proceeds from 
facts and legal issues, not results.  
Vázquez and Vladeck recognize that catch-all doctrinalism can be outcome-
determinative. Had the courts denying Bivens claims considered the proper 
doctrines, they “could not have ruled for the defendants merely because of a 
disinclination to engage in judicial lawmaking,” but would have had to 
engage in more wide-ranging interest balancing. 31 There is more at stake as 
well. Courts are supposed to reach results by considering facts and legal 
issues. Catch-all doctrinalism does the opposite, interpreting facts and 
legal issues through the lens of results, and grounding outcomes not on 
legal analysis but on judges’ intuitions about whether recovery should be 
precluded. Rather than treating like cases alike, catch-all doctrinalism 
 
29 Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 8, at 523-24.  
30 Elsewhere, I illustrate how catch-all doctrinalism operates by discussing each irrelevant 
doctrine cited in Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, one of the cases Vázquez and Vladeck address. 
See Bernstein, supra note 2, at 754-64.  
31 Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 8, at 529-30.  
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treats as dispositive cases that address altogether different questions. 
Substituting one question for another is more than mere sloppiness. It 
violates a basic principle of the rule of law. 
Catch-all doctrinalism harms not only the doctrine that it should use, 
but also those doctrines that it uses instead. When a court finds a Bivens 
action inappropriate because the governing law is unclear,32 it fails in its 
duty to clarify the law and further develop the qualified immunity doc-
trine.33 When a court refuses to hear a case because secret information may be 
implicated, it fails to enforce laws specifically designed to balance the Execu-
tive’s need for secrecy with the adversarial system’s need for disclosure.34  
One might defend this approach on efficiency grounds. If all doctrines 
lead to the same result, why not get to it as quickly as possible? But a look at 
how catch-all doctrinalism actually works refutes this defense. Courts 
generally do not perform the doctrinal analysis necessary to determine 
whether qualified immunity, the state secrets privilege, political question 
doctrine, or other doctrines will eventually preclude a Bivens action. Rather, 
they invoke the specter of these doctrines—or the specter of the harms 
these doctrines are intended to prevent—to provide an atmospheric analysis 
in which the actual doctrine plays little part.35  
Catch-all doctrinalism resembles psychology’s “substitution principle,” 
in which a mind confronting a difficult question answers an easier one 
instead.36 This principle suggests that judicial laziness—the desire for a 
simple analysis—might account for courts’ reliance on catch-all doctrinalism. 
Yet, the question substituted in Bivens cases is not always easier to answer 
 
32 See, e.g., Arar, 585 F.3d at 580 (declining to recognize a Bivens claim in part because the 
situation presents a “complex and rapidly changing legal framework beset with critical legal 
judgments that have not yet been made”).  
33 See Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2031 (2011) (“[If] [c]ourts fail to clarify uncer-
tain questions, fail to address novel claims, fail to give guidance to officials about how to 
comply with legal requirements[,] . . . [q]ualified immunity . . . may frustrate the develop-
ment of constitutional precedent and the promotion of law-abiding behavior.” (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted)). 
34 See, e.g., Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1-16 (2006 & Supp. 
2010) (laying out procedures by which to prevent disclosure of classified information in criminal 
proceedings); Arar, 585 F.3d at 605 (Sack, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing 
the purpose of the state secrets privilege and when that privilege may be invoked); see also 26 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 5661, at 416 (1992 & Supp. 2012) (noting that Congress considered and rejected a 
rule specifically limiting the use of classified information in civil proceedings). 
35 See Bernstein, supra note 2, at 754-64 (explaining how Arar exemplifies this type of analysis). 
36 See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 97 (2011) (explaining that 
“[i]f a satisfactory answer to a hard question is not found quickly, [individuals] will find a 
related question that is easier and will answer it [instead],” without realizing that they are 
not, in fact, answering the original question). 
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than the question originally posed. A court analyzing qualified immunity, 
for example, should not find it difficult to determine whether clearly 
established law prohibits federal employees from torturing American 
citizens,37 or detaining individuals in the United States incommunicado 
to prevent access to counsel.38 
Looking past the doctrinal muddle reveals that recent opinions rejecting 
Bivens claims focus predominantly on prudential, rather than legal, consid-
erations. They stress that the Executive is busy doing a difficult job, and 
that individual lawsuits disrupt the efficient performance of that job;39 that 
national security is of paramount importance;40 and that individual com-
plaints have no business affecting policy.41 This reasoning suggests that it is 
neither doctrinal efficiency nor simplicity that motivates catch-all doctrinalism. 
Catch-all doctrinalism is driven by the desirability of the outcome.  
CONCLUSION 
Professors Vázquez and Vladeck make an important contribution to our 
understanding of Bivens in both its federal and its federalist contexts. 
They challenge courts to follow through on their own statutory interpreta-
tions and claimed goals. If the authors’ aim is to make courts less averse to 
Bivens claims,42 then I applaud their elucidation of the law and their 
exhortation to take its implications seriously.  
 
37 See, e.g., Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193, 196 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (noting that the 
Army Field Manual classifies much of the treatment to which military officers subjected plaintiffs 
“as ‘physical torture,’ ‘mental torture’ or ‘coercion’” (citation omitted)).  
38 See, e.g., Arar, 585 F.3d at 566 (noting that the complaint alleged that plaintiff ’s “attorney 
was given false information about [plaintiff ’s] whereabouts” by defendants). 
39 See, e.g., Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540, 553 (4th Cir. 2012) (noting that, on a prac-
tical level, plaintiff ’s claim “risks interference with military and intelligence operations on a 
wide scale”); Vance, 701 F.3d at 199 (observing that “military efficiency depends on a particular 
command structure, which civilian judges could mess up without appreciating what they were 
doing” (citation omitted)); Arar, 585 F.3d at 574 (determining that plaintiff ’s suit would 
“unavoidably . . . invade[] government interests, enmesh[] government lawyers, and thereby 
elicit[] government funds for settlement”).  
40 See, e.g., Arar, 585 F.3d at 575 (explaining courts’ traditional reluctance to intrude upon execu-
tive authority with regard to national security matters absent express authorization from Congress). 
41 See, e.g., Lebron, 670 F.3d at 551 (“[Plaintiff ’s] complaint seeks quite candidly to have 
the judiciary review and disapprove sensitive military decisions made after extensive 
deliberations within the executive branch . . . .”).  
42 See James E. Pfander & David P. Baltmanis, Response, W(h)ither Bivens?, 161 U. PA. L. 
REV. ONLINE 231, 248  (2013), http://www.pennlawreview.com/responses/4-2013/Pfander 
Baltmanis.pdf (agreeing with Vázquez and Vladeck’s goal of restoring a “presumptive recognition 
of the right to pursue a Bivens action,” despite disputing their statutory interpretation). 
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At the same time, I am not convinced, as a matter of analysis, that elu-
cidating the law addresses what courts are actually doing when they reject 
Bivens claims. It is difficult to understand these opinions’ doctrinal 
conflations as simple misreadings of law. They make more sense as 
expressions of a policy desire—conscious or not—to protect the Executive 
from the individuals it harms.43  
This motivation may be rooted in a number of convictions: the belief 
that lawsuits excessively disrupt executive efficiency, and that such efficiency 
should override individual rights; the belief that national security requires 
an Executive free to act as it thinks it needs to, even if its acts violate 
individual rights;44 the belief that elections provide all the influence an 
individual ought to have over executive policy choices. But it is impossible 
to make sense of recent Bivens jurisprudence without, in some way, assum-
ing the goal of executive insulation. Evaluating the relevant prudential 
concerns—and their relation to institutional realities—may tell us more 
about Bivens than the Westfall Act can.  
 
 
Preferred Citation: Anya Bernstein, Response, Catch-All Doctrinalism 
and Judicial Desire, 161 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 221 (2013), http://www. 
pennlawreview.com/responses/4-2013/Bernstein.pdf. 
 
 
43 This is not necessarily the same as shielding the Executive against all intrusions. For instance, 
one study found that, in noncriminal detention cases arising out of national security projects, 
federal courts loath to provide “individualized . . . remedies” nonetheless tend to “grant 
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